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Abstract 
This essay traces the vein of thought represented by Calabresi’s The Costs of 
Accidents, both backward in time to examine its sources, and forward to its 
impact on current scholarship.  I focus on three broad topics: positive versus 
normative law and economics, positivist versus anti-positivist thinking in law; and 
the assumption of rationality in law and economics. 
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No lecture on the history of thought in law and economics would be 
complete without some discussion of Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents.1  
The book has had an enormous influence on the field.  It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that modern law and economics, as we see it practiced today, 
had its start with Gary Becker’s article on crime2 and Guido Calabresi’s book, 
both products of the late 1960s.3 
 
In this essay I want to identify and trace the vein of thought represented by 
Calabresi’s book, both backward in time to examine its sources, and forward to its 
impact on current scholarship.  I will focus on three broad topics: positive versus 
normative work in law and economics; positivist versus anti-positivist thinking in 
law, and especially law and economics; and, lastly, the assumption of rationality 
in the economic analysis of law.  Before tackling these topics, I will start with an 
effort to locate Calabresi’s book within the history of economic analysis of law. 
 
A Bird’s Eye View of the Intellectual History of Law and Economics 
 
Law and economics views law from an instrumentalist perspective.  That 
is a perspective that seeks to determine the function of law and the manner in 
which it solves the social problems thrown before it.  Bentham is the most 
obvious source that comes to mind for this approach.  Bentham’s core 
contribution to legal theory was a rejection of the view that law should be 
understood as emanating from or growing out of some set of a priori fundamental 
rights.  Blackstone had led students to think of the law in this way, and Bentham, 
as one of those students, seemed to have staked his career on overturning this 
view.  He succeeded; though Blackstone was a more complicated thinker than 
Bentham’s early caricature suggests. 
 
Blackstone himself incorporated instrumentalist reasoning in parts of his 
Commentaries.4  His volume on criminal law both refers to and shows the 
influence of Beccaria’s utilitarian writing on punishment.5  Taking the sum of his 
views as a theorist, Blackstone presents a muddled picture. He comes across as 
utilitarian in his treatment of criminal law, and a promoter of non-
consequentialist, fundamental-rights theory in other parts of the Commentaries; 
                                                 
1 The complete citation is Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis (Yale University Press, 1970). 
2 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). 
3 The near simultaneous appearance of Becker’s article and Calabresi’s book may reflect broader 
changes in public policy views during the 1960s.  For a discussion of the changes in perspective 
among American lawyers during the 1960s, and likely influences on the law, see Gary T. 
Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 Ga. L. 
Rev. 601 (1992). 
4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) 
(1765-69). 
5 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (Henry Paolucci ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963). 
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especially when he discusses the most basic protections provided by the common 
law – of life, liberty, property.6 
 
As I have suggested, the instrumentalist or functionalist approach to law 
typically identified with Bentham makes some appearances in the theoretical 
literature that predates Bentham.  The case of Beccaria I have already mentioned.  
Beccaria’s theory that punishment should be set at a level that wipes out the 
expected gains of the criminal actor, and not above that level, formed the basis of 
his influential critique of criminal law enforcement published in 1764.  Beccaria’s 
critique served as the chief source of theoretical insights for Blackstone’s 
treatment of criminal law, and also likely served as the chief inspiration for 
Bentham’s work on criminal law.  While Blackstone provided a negative 
inspiration for Bentham, a figure that Bentham would caricature, ridicule, and 
hold up as an example of all that is wrong with legal theory;7 Beccaria provided a 
positive inspiration. 
 
Almost at the same time as Beccaria was writing, Adam Smith gave 
lectures on jurisprudence to a class at Glasgow University.  Notes from those 
lectures are published under the title Lectures on Jurisprudence.8  Smith’s 
lectures, seldom discussed in the law and economics literature, provide really the 
first sustained treatment of law from an economic perspective.  Smith provides 
especially detailed discussions of property and criminal law.  His lectures on 
criminal law, anticipating Becker, argue that criminal penalties tend to be 
inversely related to the probability of detection.  Smith’s work has never received 
the attention showered on Bentham, which I find puzzling. 
 
Immediately before Beccaria and Smith, one finds Hume’s discussion of 
property and norms, which treats property law as the result of an implicit contract 
that develops over time within a society.9  While Hume influenced Smith, he 
appears not to have influenced Bentham.  Before Hume, one finds Hobbes’s 
discussion of the common law, arguing that the king should have a strong hand in 
interpreting the law, and, more importantly, suggesting that the law’s purpose is 
to maximize social welfare.10 
 
                                                 
6 Another reason Blackstone’s perspective as a theorist is unclear is that he shows influences from 
Hobbes in parts of his discussion.  His perspective may be closer to utilitarian than is commonly 
recognized. 
7 See Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries: A Criticism of William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Charles W. Everett ed., 1928).  For an illuminating 
discussion of Bentham and Blackstone, see Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 13-47 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
8 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence: The Glasgow Edition (R.L. Meet et al. eds., Oxford 
University Press 1978) (1762-65). 
9 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature 484-501 (Prometheus Books 1992)(1737). 
10 Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of 
England (Joseph Cropsey ed., U. of Chicago Press 1971) (1681). 
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Although Bentham is generally viewed as the source of instrumentalism in 
legal theory, I think the starting point is Hobbes.  For at the core of 
instrumentalism is a notion that the law’s purpose should be understood from the 
perspective of what an economist would call a social planner or what a 
philosopher might call a Platonic philosopher-king.  Hobbes is probably the 
fundamental source for the argument that law should not be understood or 
justified only on its own terms, or, equivalently, rejecting the notion that law can 
only be understood or justified by a lawyer steeped in the intricacies of legal 
opinions and terminology.  Law and economics practitioners make the argument 
frequently today; the first wave of legal realists, including Holmes, made the 
argument several generations ago.  Bentham preceded the realists by roughly 100 
years.  All of them are partly in debt to Hobbes. 
 
I am not suggesting that Bentham is not the key or most important source 
for instrumentalism.  He clearly is, especially for the law and economics school.  
However, being the most important source is not the same thing as being the 
starting point.  The starting point for instrumentalism in law is the notion of 
detachment; that the law should be justifiable to a detached spectator who is not 
committed to maintaining some set of perceived logical connections among 
various legal doctrines.  Once that notion is accepted, we have the groundwork set 
for all instrumentalist theories of law.  And note that Kantian arguments are in 
essence instrumentalist, as are utilitarian arguments. 
 
Now let’s move back up to Bentham, in whose work we see a purposive 
and goal-oriented marriage of instrumentalism and utilitarianism, and consider the 
development of law and economics from this point.  After Bentham, roughly 100 
years passed before Holmes wrote The Common Law, presenting a largely 
utilitarian justification for the law.  But there are big differences from Bentham’s 
approach.  Holmes backs away from the detachment of Hobbes and Bentham: he 
wants us to understand the law and its internal logic.  Holmes backs away from 
the role of independent critic or censor.  He sets out to justify the law as it is. 
 
Following Holmes, we find another long dry spell up to the roughly 
simultaneous publications of Calabresi’s Costs and Becker’s article on crime.11  
There are interesting similarities between the two works.  Both Becker and 
Calabresi step comfortably into the role of detachment, following the tradition of 
                                                 
11 I refer to this period as a dry spell only because there does not appear to be anything as 
ambitious in scope as we see at the endpoints (Holmes on one end, Calabresi on the other).  
However, there were novel and important contributions to law and economics over this period.  
The best known is that of Ronald Coase, see R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & 
Econ. 1 (1960) (setting out the “Coase Theorem,” which holds that if transaction costs are low, 
individuals will bargain their way to an efficient arrangement, whatever the liability rule).  While 
the Coase Theorem has become perhaps the key starting point for any economic analysis of law, I 
have not focused on it here because it is not associated with a broad school of thought in law and 
economics.  Other important contributions are those of Aaron Director, probably the founder of 
“Chicago School” antitrust analysis, and Ward Bowman.  The institutional economics of John R. 
Commons is another important contribution.   
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Hobbes and Bentham.  Neither thinks it is important for his reader to understand 
the law from the perspective of a specialist in the common law.  This is obviously 
natural for Becker, since he had no training as a lawyer.  For Calabresi, 
Hobbesian detachment is a bit tougher to explain.  After all, this is an individual 
who had distinguished himself as one of the best trained lawyers of his 
generation.  Yet, there we find him in Costs, proceeding as if the law were of 
secondary importance at best. 
 
Indeed, one could describe the personality reflected in Calabresi’s Costs as 
one of hyper-detachment.  The book describes itself as a “legal and economic 
analysis,” which it most assuredly is.  But Calabresi takes a position of 
detachment from both the law and the economics.  He prefaces his economic 
remarks in several parts of the book with comments such as “an economist would 
say,”12 to remind us that he does not necessarily agree with them.  He tells us 
early on that economics is good for solving certain problems, but not all 
problems, especially those involving basic questions of identity or morality.13  In 
spite of this, he conducts an economic analysis that appears to be on the highest 
level of sophistication that one could imagine for the topic at hand.  And as 
Michelman noted in his review,14 Calabresi shows a far greater awareness of the 
machinery of law and government, and the limits of human rationality, than even 
the best economists would have brought to the task.  
 
Calabresi’s book and Becker’s article are thoroughly in the tradition of 
Bentham.  Like Bentham, both Calabresi and Becker apply utilitarianism in an 
effort to promote sweeping reforms of vast areas of the law.  In Calabresi’s case, 
his ultimate goal is to replace the “fault system” (or negligence regime) of tort law 
with one based on strict liability for injury-causing activities.  Becker, on the 
other hand, aims to change the goal of criminal punishment from completely 
deterring criminal acts to internalizing costs to offenders.  Both reforms are so 
ambitious that neither author seriously could have expected to see them 
implemented within his lifetime. 
 
Also like Bentham, the reforms suggested by Calabresi and Becker would 
have the effect of undermining established law in their chosen research areas, to 
the point of making it irrelevant.  Calabresi’s approach is most clearly similar to 
Bentham’s, as his reforms would have required abandoning the negligence rule 
and all of the complicated law that has grown out of it.  Calabresi’s approach 
would have replaced the core of tort doctrine with simpler, more direct, liability 
rules that, on a statistical basis, would have loaded liability on the most 
appropriate actors (the cheapest cost avoiders).   Becker’s approach would have 
resulted in a Bentham-like revolution in an indirect manner.  By changing the 
system of penalties to ones based on cost-internalization, it would no longer be 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 1, at 72 (discussing optimal pricing based on social cost). 
13 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 18. 
14 Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi’s Costs, 80 
Yale L. J. 647 (1971) (book review). 
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necessary under Becker’s regime to know whether you had violated the law.  If 
we could calculate the external costs of your actions accurately, we could impose 
those costs on you, and the law, whatever it says, would eventually whither away 
– like law under Marxism.   
 
The next development following Calabresi and Becker was the publication 
of the first edition of Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law.  Just as 
Holmes bought into utilitarianism but rejected the reform efforts of Bentham, 
Posner bought into economic analysis and rejected the reform efforts of Calabresi 
and Becker.  Like Holmes, Posner defended the law as it is.  However, Posner is 
much more explicit in his adoption of economic theory than Holmes.  Posner 
claims that the common law aims to maximize wealth, which is distinguishable 
from utilitarianism, largely in the sense that wealth maximization makes no effort 
to take into account differences in individual preferences, except in so far as those 
differences are expressed in the market through prices.  Wealth maximization, as 
an objective, yields a result that is probably identical to that of Adam Smith’s 
impartial spectator, who also made no effort to take into account differences in 
individual preferences when he decided whether some allocation was appropriate.  
Holmes, on the other hand, was writing at a stage when there was far less 
scientific capital to use in his own work, and speaking to a somewhat different 
audience.  In addition, he appears to be more of a utilitarian, and more Hobbesian, 
in the sense that he believes that laws, real laws, must be “living and armed,”15 or 
backed up by the preferences of a forceful group. 
 
Since the purpose of this essay is to examine the contributions of 
Calabresi’s book to law and economics, I will not continue to go forward tracing 
the general development of law and economics.  I have said enough here in my 
effort to locate Calabresi’s work within the broad current of thought in law and 
economics.  I will turn now to consider some of the tensions between Calabresi’s 
approach and alternatives that have developed along the way. 
 
Positive versus Normative Law and Economics 
 
Students of economics are familiar with the distinction between positive 
economics and normative economics.  Positive economics seeks merely to explain 
institutions or conventions that exist.  Normative economics seeks to tell us how 
institutions or conventions should be designed.  The same distinction applies to 
law and economics.  Positive law and economics seeks explain the law, or the 
legal system, as it is.  Normative law and economics seeks to describe how the 
law or the legal system should be. 
 
Calabresi’s Costs, with its criticism of the negligence regime and 
argument that it should be replaced by simpler rules based on strict liability, is 
clearly in the normative category.  Calabresi’s approach puts him firmly in the 
                                                 
15 Hobbes, supra note 10, at 59 (Hobbes makes the point in his dialogue that real laws are “living 
and armed” and therefore distinguishable from the laws of “reason” promoted by the philosopher). 
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camp of Bentham, who wanted to scrap the common law, and replace it with a 
simpler set of rules that would be easier to follow and lead to more predictable 
outcomes.  Indeed, normative law and economics begins more or less with 
Bentham, and then has its next most significant advance in Calabresi’s Costs.  
Probably the majority of modern articles on law and economics are normative 
analyses, especially among the pieces based on mathematical modeling.16 
 
Positive law and economics, on the other hand, arguably begins with 
Adam Smith’s lectures, though they appear to have had no clear influence on 
anyone.  Although one can find instances in which scholars have rediscovered 
points discussed in Smith – e.g., the notion that an efficient system would impose 
higher penalties when the probability of detection is low; or the notion, stressed 
by Holmes, that the criminal law has its roots in vengeance – it is quite difficult to 
find citations to Smith’s lectures.  The next step along the positive path, roughly 
100 years after Smith, is Holmes’s The Common Law.  That is followed, again by 
another 100 years, by Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law.  Today, positive 
economic analysis of law continues to be published, though it seems to be less 
attractive to scholars than normative analysis. 
 
A normative economic analysis typically begins with the derivation and 
specification of an objective function, which the analyst then argues is optimized 
by his particular policy prescription.  In Calabresi’s analysis, he describes the 
objective function as the sum of the injury and avoidance costs associated with 
accidents (primary costs), risk-spreading costs (secondary costs), and 
administrative costs (tertiary costs).17  This description of the tort system’s 
objective is now the standard approach to evaluating the operational efficiency of 
the tort system.  The core of Calabresi’s argument for reform is that a system of 
strict liability rules, directed at the appropriate activities, comes much closer to 
minimizing the sum of primary, secondary, and tertiary costs than does the fault 
system. 
 
In view of the greater popularity of normative law and economics among 
today’s scholars, Calabresi’s Costs has been a success in terms of inspiring the 
work of generations that followed.  In addition to the inspiration provided by 
Calabresi, the reasons for this success are several.  First, normative law and 
economics does not require a huge investment in learning the details of legal 
doctrine.  Thus, a normative scholar should find it easier to work across 
disciplines and to gain the interest of scholars in other disciplines.  Second, given 
the view in most law faculties that economics is a conservative mode of thought, 
normative work may appear especially attractive to law professors who do not 
                                                 
16See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, Journal of Legal Studies, 1982; A. 
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 869 (1998); Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation under Strict Liability, 
4 Am. Law & Econ. Rev. 18 (2002). 
17 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 26-29. 
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specialize in economics (i.e., the majority of law professors) and to law students 
as well. 
 
The question lurking beneath this is whether the relative advantage 
enjoyed by normative law and economics is a desirable result.  Is it a good thing 
for legal scholarship, or scholarship in general, that the Bentham-Calabresi line of 
law and economics scholarship is now more popular than the Smith-Holmes-
Posner line? 
 
I think there is a case to be made that it is not a good thing, and that law 
and economics scholarship and legal scholarship generally will suffer in the long 
term as a result.  The case begins with the view espoused by Karl Popper and 
Milton Friedman on the relative value of positive analysis in economics.18  The 
Popper-Friedman argument is that economic analysis is most valuable when it is 
helping us solve existing puzzles, to understand institutions or conventions that 
exist, and less valuable when used to design new institutions. 
 
The argument behind the Popper-Friedman position is as follows.  When 
we approach complicated social institutions or conventions, like the law, we are 
looking at a system that has evolved over time, and has along the way adapted to 
constraints and solved problems.  The analyst often cannot easily discover the 
information that is embodied within the system’s design.  Economic analysis, 
however, can be quite useful in this discovery process.  In a similar fashion, 
normative analysis that attempts to redesign a social system from scratch – for 
example, redesigning the law of torts – is at a disadvantage for the same reason; 
the analyst may not understand all of the information embodied in the existing 
system. 
 
This argument applies to economic analysis of law.  Indeed, the argument 
applies most strongly here, if it applies anywhere.  If there is any validity at all to 
the Popper-Friedman view, that validity must surely be observed in the case of the 
legal system, and particularly the common law.  The common law is a system that 
has evolved – a “grown order” in Hayek’s terms19 – responding at various times 
to constraints that may no longer be obvious.  With such systems, the analyst with 
a reformist agenda should show some humility. 
 
The proper degree of humility, however, is generally lacking in normative 
economic analysis of law.  To be sure, thoughtful analysts show awareness of the 
limitations of their own analysis; Calabresi, for example, is constantly questioning 
and reexamining his own arguments in Costs.  But the self-doubt one observes in 
Calabresi’s book is rarely found in normative analyses today. 
                                                 
18 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2, p.95 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966); Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 5 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1953). 
19 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order 35-54 (1973); Hayek, The 
Constitution of Liberty 160 (University of Chicago Press, 1960) (using term “spontaneous order”). 
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Even when doubts are expressed openly, there is no getting around the 
problem of uncertainty and limited knowledge.  The normative law and 
economics approach, from Bentham to Calabresi to modern analysts, reflects at 
bottom an arrogant belief in the power of theory to provide useful policies for 
reforming complicated institutions.  And law certainly qualifies as a complicated 
social institution.  This may seem to be an excessively harsh assessment.  
However, what should one say about the implicit assumption underlying a 
substantial part of the normative project, when an analyst claims to have found a 
reform that solves a complicated systemic problem that has bedeviled countless 
individuals participating in the system for many years, many of whom are quite as 
thoughtful as the normative analyst? 
 
As a contributor to the normative law and economics literature (with a 
personal stake in its success), I realize that this critique should not be taken too 
far.  At its extreme, it is defeatist in its suggestion that there is no point in 
applying normative economic analysis to law.  The critique seems to say that if 
there is a neat solution to a problem in the legal system, then you should not 
trouble yourself with proposing it, because if it were really such a neat solution 
someone would have discovered it long before you.   
 
I do not wish to convey that message.  However, I do think it is important 
for law and economics analysts to consider the possibility that there is more 
normative analysis in the literature today than warranted by its value relative to 
positive analysis.  The common law is full of puzzles in the form of doctrines 
whose functions are generally not understood.  Economic analysis of law, at least 
to the Popper-Friedman sympathizers, serves its most useful purpose when it is 
helping us solve those puzzles.  It seems improper, in any event, to surge ahead 
with one normative analysis after another before even attempting to apply 
economics to gain a better understanding of the common law as it is.  If positive 
analysis is useful in discovering the information hidden in a social institution, 
such as the law, then analysts should try to uncover that information before 
proposing legislative reforms. 
 
Positivists Versus Anti-Positivists 
 
While the term positive analysis refers to efforts to use economics to 
explain institutions, the term positivism, to lawyers, refers to the view that the 
only laws that exist are those in the statute books or likely to be enforced by the 
state.  An anti-positivist would argue that laws also include norms or conventions 
that people respect, even if they are not in a law book anywhere or the state is 
unlikely to enforce them.  One version of anti-positivism is the classical common 
law theory of Blackstone, which views the law as resulting from the norms of 
“reasonable conduct” adopted within society.20 
                                                 
20 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1, 63-92 (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 1979) (1765-69). 
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Anti-positivism has not fared well in the law and economics literature.  
Hume is the first to bring this approach to the economic analysis of law.21  Hume 
argued that we determine through long experience that certain acts are harmful to 
social welfare, and society develops norms discouraging those acts.22  Over time, 
those norms become publicly asserted as law.  Somewhat later, Hayek argued that 
the law evolves from norms that develop through social intercourse.23  Bruno 
Leoni extended this line of reasoning to provide one of the early arguments for the 
economic efficiency of common law.24 
 
Calabresi does not take a clear position on the positivism versus anti-
positivism debate.  However, because his approach is so similar to Bentham’s, it 
is implicitly positivist. The most basic component of that approach is what I have 
referred to as detachment, the notion that one does not feel a need to study or 
explain the law in great detail in order to evaluate it.  While one can be detached 
in this sense, and not positivist, it seems to me that one must be a positivist if he is 
detached.  The reason is that if the detached analyst does not need to explain or 
work through the legal doctrines carefully in order to reach an assessment of the 
law, he clearly will perceive no need to study norms as generators of legal 
doctrine.  Hence, the detached analyst is never an anti-positivist as I have defined 
the term.  On the other hand, if the analyst is evaluating the law, he must have 
some minimal sense of what it consists of, which would seem to require a 
positivist’s conception of law. 
 
I doubt that any anti-positivist, or believer in norms as important sources 
of law, could ever be detached in the sense of Bentham and Calabresi.  If you 
believe that norms are an important source – let’s say, the most important source 
– of common law, then you probably also think that those norms develop over 
time through implicit contracts.  It follows that you would see it as important to 
understand precisely how these norms meet the expectations of the parties.  
Consider the contract analogy.  If you were looking at a contract between an 
employer and employee, would you evaluate the desirability of a specific contract 
term by analyzing its incentive effects, or by trying to determine if the term made 
sense in terms of the expectations of the parties?  The anti-positivist position 
seems to rule out detachment because it requires a careful examination of 
common law doctrine. 
 
I suspect that the influence Calabresi’s Costs is one of the reasons anti-
positivism has been in the shadows of law and economics.  Neither Becker nor 
Calabresi made any references to Leoni, Hayek, or Hume in their contributions.  
Perhaps their examples had some influence on Posner, who does not discuss or 
even cite any of the anti-positivist literature that preceded his book.  Modern 
                                                 
21 Hume, supra note 9, 484-501. 
22 Id. 
23 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order 35-54 (1973). 
24 Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law 59-96 (1961). 
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generations of scholars, raised on Becker, Calabresi, and Posner, seem to be 
largely unaware of this strand of law and economics. 
 
The one difference in this trend is represented by the new “norms” 
literature.25  But this literature has not, so far, returned to the original direction of 
the early anti-positivist law and economics literature.  The new norms literature 
has not attempted, as far as I am aware, to provide a deeper understanding of the 
common law, or suggested significant reasons to question the positivist approach 
common in the modern literature. 
 
Rationality in the Law and Economics Literature 
 
The last topic I will consider is the role played by the rationality 
assumption in law and economics and Calabresi’s influence on that role.  Law and 
economics is often criticized, especially in the law journals, for adhering too 
strongly to the rational man model.  Critics have argued that people do not always 
behave as rational actors, that they do not carefully and accurately weigh the costs 
and benefits of their anticipated actions. 
 
The critique of rationality in law and economics is difficult to assess and 
may collapse into triviality.  The process of natural selection should make some 
responses to external events strong enough to overwhelm our attempts to 
calculate, and yet these inborn tendencies do not prove that man is never a 
rational actor.  Alternatively, someone may calculate the immediate costs and 
benefits of a particular action carefully, and then after realizing that it would be 
costly to reveal to others that he had done so, lie about his motives or take an 
irrational act.  By his words, or perhaps by his actions, he would not appear to be 
rational.  Finally, some minimal degree of rationality must be accepted even by 
critics of the rationality assumption.  For if men are completely or always 
irrational, laws are pointless. 
 
In any event, the rational man assumption that critics have in mind is one 
of an individual who always weighs the costs and benefits of his anticipated 
actions, and always takes the act with the greatest net benefit (benefit in excess of 
cost).  The rational actor fails to take care when the cost of taking care is greater 
than the benefits he captures, or the liability he avoids, through care.  The rational 
actor breaches a contract whenever the benefit from breaching exceeds the cost.  
The rational actor commits a crime whenever the benefit from the criminal act 
                                                 
25 Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to 
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 1996 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1643 
(1996); Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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exceeds the expected penalty.  These benefits and costs are typically reduced to 
dollars so that the rational man can make an apples-to-apples comparison.26 
 
This version of the rational man model is a relatively recent feature of the 
law and economics literature.  Bentham held to a version of the rational man 
assumption.  He argued that all men calculate, even the insane.  However, 
Bentham made some allowance for departures from the extreme or strong 
rationality assumption.  His suggestions for outrageous punishments imply a 
belief that criminals often did not attempt to foresee and calculate the 
consequences of their actions, and so it was necessary to design penalties that 
would attract their attention.27  For example, suppose the typical prospective 
rapist does not rationally convert his expected hedonic gains and anticipated 
punishment into a common denominator, such as dollars.  He might find these 
different expectations incommensurable, and given this inability to convert gains 
and losses into the same terms, may discount the losses from punishment 
entirely.28  A punishment such as castration, which has the flavor of Bentham, 
might be superior in its deterrent effect because the prospective rapist finds it 
easier to evaluate the punishment in precisely the same terms as he evaluates his 
hedonic gains. 
 
Given his utilitarian approach, Holmes must have believed that men were 
rational and would respond rationally to penalties.  However, Holmes did not 
have a clear need to assume a strong form of rationality.  He was concerned with 
explaining the logic of the law, not with analyzing its deterrent impact. 
 
Becker and Calabresi represent a fork in the road in the development of 
the rationality assumption in the law and economics literature.  Becker presents a 
model in which criminals are rational actors.  It makes sense in Becker’s model, 
to reduce the probability of capture to near zero and increase the fine to near 
                                                 
26 This description of the rational actor suggests that what is really special about the assumption is 
that it places severe restrictions on the actor’s utility function.  One could imagine an individual 
who enjoys breaching contracts.  His utility function should take into account his taste for breach.  
Given those preferences, one could say that his tendency to always breach, even in cases where the 
net monetary payoff is negative, is rational.  But the rational actor model excludes such cases.  
This is a basic definitional issue that runs throughout this paper’s discussion of rationality, and the 
rationality debate in law and economics generally.  I am indebted to Bob Bone for bringing this to 
my attention.    
27 For Bentham’s suggested punishments, see Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment, 
Book 1, chapter 8, Section 3, 60-61 (punishment of “offending member”); Book 2, Chapter II, 
Sections 1 -3, 76-93 (deformation and mutilation as possible punishments) (London: Robert 
Heward, 1830)  
28 Bentham said that in order to encourage the potential offender to take his prospective penalty 
into account before committing an offense, a punishment should have some “characteristic” 
relating it to the offense.  See Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation 192 
(Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1988)(1781) (Punishment cannot act any farther than in as far as the 
idea of it, and of its connection with the offence, is present in the mind.  The idea of it, if not 
present, cannot act at all … Now, to be present, it must be remembered, and to be remembered it 
must have been learnt…When this is the case with a punishment and an offence, the punishment is 
said to bear an analogy to, or to be characteristic of, the offence.). 
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infinity, because this maintains a high expected penalty and at the same time 
saves the state the costs of frequent enforcement efforts.  This is the sort of 
prescription that could only come from a model that assumes a strong form of 
rationality.  Studies of behavior and psychology – e.g., those of B.F. Skinner29 – 
suggest, contrary to Becker’s model of deterrence, that people learn best through 
frequent rewards or penalties in connection to desired or undesired acts. 
 
Calabresi, on the other hand, allows for less than perfect rationality and 
the need for the state to act paternalistically at times.  In particular, Calabresi 
describes four important deviations from the strong form of rationality.30  First, 
people may not have enough information to make rational decisions.  Second, 
even if given sufficient information, they may suffer from an optimism bias – a 
belief that bad things will happen only to other people.  Third, they may be 
judgment proof, so that an increase in the amount of liability in excess of their 
assets has no marginal effect on their incentives for care.  Fourth, and most 
interesting, Calabresi argues that people are likely to do poorly in comparing 
short-term benefits and long-term costs – a problem he describes in terms of the 
Faustian bargain.  Part of the problem may be free-riding, or a version of the 
familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma. Knowing that society will not want to see me suffer 
in my old age, I may not save today, expecting society to help me out when I 
reach poverty in my later years.  This is perfectly rational behavior at an 
individual level, but irrational on an aggregate level.  Another part of the problem 
is time-inconsistency in preferences.  Looking at his overall preferences, Ulysses 
knows that he should pay no attention to the Sirens.  However, at the point at 
which he hears their song, he can only see clearly the part of his preference map 
directly in front of him.  Because our preferences are dependent upon the 
perspective from which we view them, we may rationally choose to take actions 
in the short run that are welfare-reducing in the long run.  
 
To be sure, both Becker and Calabresi assumed that men are rational.  The 
difference between their approaches is in the degree of rationality posited.  Becker 
assumes rationality in its strongest form.  His argument that deterrence could be 
maintained under a program that reduces the frequency of punishment while 
increasing its severity assumed a degree of rationality that had never received 
support from behavioral studies in the social sciences.  Famous studies by Skinner 
and others that long predated Becker’s paper suggested that people do not behave 
as rationally as Becker’s model assumed.31  Calabresi, in contrast, assumes a 
weak form of rationality; that men are basically rational subject to some pretty 
consistent deviations.    
 
From this fork in the road, with Becker adopting strong-form rationality 
and Calabresi a weak form, the law and economics literature seems to have taken 
                                                 
29 B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York, The Free Press, 1953). 
30 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 55-60. 
31 E.g., Skinner, supra note 26; C.B. Ferster & B.F. Skinner, Schedules of Reinforcement (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957). 
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Becker’s path.  Posner, whose name is virtually synonymous with the Chicago 
School, adhered to Becker’s approach to rationality, and the strong rationality 
assumption has since become a defining characteristic of Chicago-School Law 
and Economics. 
 
It should be clear that things did not need to go this way.  There is nothing 
special about the strong-form rationality assumption that makes it a necessary 
feature of the economic analysis of law.  The scholars, largely Chicago-School, 
who immediately followed Becker and Calabresi could have chosen to follow 
Calabresi’s example rather than Becker’s.  If that path had been followed, there 
would be far less criticism of law and economics.  The behavioral law and 
economics school, still in its infancy, would have been old by now. 
 
It should also be clear that Calabresi’s description of weak rationality, 
remarkable in its clarity, anticipated the behavioral law and economics school by 
a generation.  The behavioral school has identified an expanding list of deviations 
from strong-form rationality: over-optimism,32 framing effects,33 endowment 
effects,34 ignorance of base-line probabilities,35 and others.36  The behavioral 
literature has expanded, in terms of scientific capital, far beyond where it stood 
when Calabresi wrote Costs, with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky providing 
a significant part of that expansion.37  Still, in the end, it appears that the 
behavioral school’s message leaves us in the same position as Calabresi had 
started, viewing men as weakly rational – i.e., rational, subject to some pretty 
consistent deviations. 
 
Calabresi’s analysis shows that the behavioralist position is not a critique 
of a deep flaw in law and economics.  It is a reaction to a particular strong-form 
version of rationality that emerged with Becker and the Chicago School.  
Economic analysis of law can easily incorporate the behavioralist position, as we 
observe in Costs.  The question is whether it would be desirable, as a general 
matter, to incorporate the behavioralist view in economic analysis of law. 
 
This is partly an empirical question.  Given my bias toward the Popper-
Friedman view, I would ask whether incorporation of the behavioralists’ results 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of 
Self-Serving Biases, 11 Journal of Economic Perspectives 109-26 (1997). 
33 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 113 
(1996). 
34 See, e.g., Richard Thaler, The Winner’s Curse 63 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
35 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
Science 1124 (1974). 
36 David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. Econ. 443-77 (1997) 
(hyperbolic discounting of future payoffs); Robert H. Frank, Thomas D. Gilovich, and Dennis T. 
Regan, Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation? 7 Journal of Economic Perspectives 159-
71 (1993) (empirical study suggesting that studying economics makes you less likely to 
cooperate).  
37 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
Econometrica 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, supra note 32. 
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improves the ability of economics to either explain the law or predict its effects.  I 
do not think that there are great stakes connected to this issue.  It is not a big 
question about methodology.  It is a small question about how quickly the law-
and-economics analyst should reach for Occam’s razor. 
 
The other perspective on the question whether behavioral analysis 
promises a substantial methodological change in law in economics starts with 
asking why we see substantial deviations from strong-form rationality.  The most 
plausible explanation is that evolution has shaped our responses to certain stimuli 
in ways that depart from the rationality model.  The role of evolution has not 
received much attention in the behavioral law and economics literature, but this 
may be its area of greatest potential.  An over-optimism bias, for example, may 
appear to be a departure from rationality on an individual level, yet it may be 
rational on an aggregate level because it imparts an evolutionary advantage.38  
Modifying the model of rationality to take into account the ways in which natural 
selection may have encouraged non-rational behavioral or thought tendencies 
could lead us to a better understanding of the social desirability of some legal 
constraints. 
 
There is, of course, the broader question whether men are largely rational 
or largely irrational.  I have not dealt with it because it is not an issue between the 
rationalists and the behavioralists.  Both sides buy into the assumption that men 
are largely rational.  And as I noted before, if men are largely irrational, laws are 
pointless.  Much of our lives are built around the assumption that people behave 
rationally.  We assume that people will follow traffic patterns rather than simply 
choose their preferred direction on any road; that they will drive over bridges 
rather than jump off of them or blow them up.  The difficulty with irrationality is 
that there are so many ways in which it can be expressed.  If the number of 
irrational individuals within a society becomes sufficiently large, the level of 
public order and coordination necessary for a functioning society collapses. 
 
In the remainder of this essay, I will briefly explore how Calabresi’s 
approach to rationality might have altered the treatment of two issues: bargaining 
under transaction costs and discrimination.  Coasean bargaining is assumed to 
take place in a setting in which rational parties are fully informed as to the 
different allocations available.  If there is a possible efficient allocation, the 
standard rationality model suggests that parties will reach an agreement that 
results in that efficient allocation.  Suppose, for example, Sam’s fence is too high, 
and Dave is willing to pay $100 to see it lowered.  Suppose the cost to Sam of 
reducing his fence is only $50.  The standard rational man analysis suggests that 
Sam and Dave will reach a bargain in which Dave agrees to pay some amount 
between $50 and $100 in exchange for Sam’s agreement to lower the fence. 
                                                 
38 In a competitive environment, an optimism bias could be beneficial to one group that has to 
compete against another.  Indeed, the inculcation of an optimism bias seems to be a central part of 
what coaches aim to do with their teams.  The evolutionary explanation for an optimism bias may 
be similar to that for altruism.  
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Suppose, instead, that people are weakly rational, as suggested by 
Calabresi, and suppose in particular that they would always prefer to impose their 
desired outcome rather than reach the efficient outcome through bargaining.  In 
other words, to return to the fence example, reaching the efficient result through 
bargaining is preferable to the status quo.  But Dave would much more enjoy 
simply imposing his preferred result rather than bargaining.  Imposing his 
preferred result saves the money that would be used in Coasean bribing, and gives 
him the added sense of hierarchical superiority that comes with having someone 
do as he bids.  This would be the type of deviation from rationality that we might 
expect in a person who had difficulty comparing short run gains to long run costs.  
Making others do as you bid is gratifying in the short run, but probably quite 
costly in the long run. 
 
Moreover, a desire to impose your will on others, to make others do as you 
bid, probably has a firm evolutionary basis.  Status hierarchies are common in 
social animals.  Humans are probably hard-wired to seek actions that have a status 
payoff.  Imposing your will on others, using them as a means to your own desired 
ends, is perhaps the clearest way of asserting superiority in a status hierarchy. 
 
Now let us reconsider the standard analysis of bargaining under 
transaction costs in the context of Calabresi’s “spongy bumpers” hypothetical. 
 
Suppose car-pedestrian accidents currently cost $100.  Suppose 
also that if cars had spongy bumpers the total accident costs would 
only be $10.  Suppose finally that spongy bumpers cost $50 more 
than the present bumpers.  Assuming no transaction costs, spongy 
bumpers would become established regardless of who was held 
responsible for car-pedestrian accidents.  If car manufacturers were 
held liable they would prefer to spend $50 for the new bumpers 
plus $0 in accident damages, instead of $100 for accident damages.  
If pedestrians were held responsible and could foresee the costs, 
they would prefer to bribe car manufacturers $50 to put in spongy 
bumpers and bear $10 in damages, rather than bear $100 in 
damages.  Exactly the same result would occur if an arbitrary third 
party, e.g., television manufacturers, were held liable initially; they 
too could lessen cost to themselves by bribing car manufacturers to 
put in spongy bumpers.39 
 
Calabresi is careful to note in his hypothetical that all parties involved 
know the costs at issue and the technological alternatives.  He then shows that if 
you add transaction costs to this hypothetical, you find that the lowest cost 
outcome may not result.  For example, it may be too expensive for pedestrians to 
bribe manufacturers to install spongy bumpers.  One question Calabresi does not 
take up in this hypothetical is why car manufacturers would not simply install the 
                                                 
39 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 136. 
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spongy bumpers and raise the price of a car by a sufficient amount to cover the 
cost.  Perhaps car consumers are too uninformed to know the value of spongy 
bumpers, or perhaps they would not receive a sufficient reduction in insurance 
rates, or perhaps pedestrians sue so infrequently that drivers bear too little of the 
costs of car-pedestrian accidents to put significant design-reform pressure on 
manufacturers.  These are all potential problems with “market deterrence” 
(liability-based deterrence) that Calabresi discusses in other parts of Costs.  Let us 
assume that one of these is true in order to continue with the hypothetical. 
 
Now alter Calabresi’s hypothetical slightly: assume that there are no 
transaction costs and that pedestrians (and television manufacturers) are not aware 
of the spongy bumpers alternative.  Suppose, in addition, that liability falls on 
pedestrians.  Since spongy bumpers would allow them to avoid $100 in losses, 
they clearly would be willing to pay at least $50 to have them installed.  In a 
Coasean bargaining game, the result would be that the manufacturer reveals the 
availability of spongy bumpers as a technological alternative, and pedestrians 
bribe the manufacturer to have them installed.  The manufacturer should be 
willing to reveal the availability of spongy bumpers because he will be able to 
collect a bribe from pedestrians that more than compensates for the cost of 
installing them. 
 
Suppose, however, that pedestrians, as a group, are like Dave in the fence 
example considered above.  They would much prefer to impose their desired 
result rather than pay for it in a Coasean bargain.  Once the manufacturer reveals 
the availability of spongy bumpers as a technological alternative, the pedestrians 
would seek to impose it.  They might petition the legislature to have a law passed 
requiring spongy bumpers on all cars.  Car manufacturers, anticipating the danger, 
would never reveal the safer alternative. 
 
This version of the spongy bumpers hypothetical is Williamsonian in the 
sense that it involves the threat of expropriation as a type of transaction cost.40  
Indeed, one could say that transaction costs are of three types: basic bargaining 
costs, i.e., the costs of meeting to bargain; information costs, i.e., the costs 
associated with asymmetric information; and opportunism costs, or costs 
connected to the threat of expropriation.  The point of this discussion, however, is 
to show that one’s approach to rationality has important implications for the 
possibility of Coasean bargaining.  Calabresi’s assumption of weak rationality 
immediately introduces obstacles to Coasean bargaining, even in settings in which 
basic bargaining costs are zero. 
 
The law and economics literature on discrimination might have developed 
differently if the weakly rational man model assumed by Calabresi had become 
the dominant approach.  The economic literature on discrimination identifies two 
                                                 
40 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 
22 J. Law & Econ. 3 (1979). 
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types: taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination.41  The former 
assumes an exogenous distaste on the part of the discriminator against the target 
group.  The latter assumes discrimination is based on statistically sound 
predictions by the discriminator of the costs of dealing with the target group.  A 
little time reading historical material on slavery in the United States, however, 
will leave you with the impression that this model is inadequate.  While taste-
based and statistical discrimination exist, both descriptions fail to capture a good 
deal of the discrimination actually observed. 
 
Viewed in its historical context, racial discrimination appears to be a 
belief, or set of beliefs, designed to support a status hierarchy.  Indeed, it appears 
that the racial discrimination observed in the U.S. served, in its formative stage, to 
support a system of slavery based on race.  Discriminatory beliefs helped 
beneficiaries of slavery directly by offering a ready moral justification for it.  
Moreover, discriminatory beliefs served the useful function of neutralizing non-
beneficiaries who might otherwise have sought to prohibit slavery.42  Since 
slavery was harmful to poor whites, convincing them to accept discriminatory 
beliefs, by giving them a sense that they had a desirable spot in the overall status 
hierarchy, would dampen their incentives to overturn the institution.  
 
We can view this description of discrimination from the same perspective 
as the spongy bumper hypothetical.  Since it is highly probable that the majority 
of southern whites were economically disadvantaged by slavery, they had an 
incentive to form a coalition that would either lessen or eliminate it.  In a Coasean 
bargaining game, they should have been willing to pay slaveholders to reduce the 
scale of the institution, in order to eliminate its harmful external effects.  On the 
other hand, they could choose to impose their preferred result rather than bargain 
for it.  Imposing a solution saves the cost of Coasean bargaining, and offers the 
added benefit of elevating one’s perceived position in the status hierarchy. 
 
                                                 
41 For a description of economic theories of discrimination, see Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. 
Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community 
Reinvestment Act, 85 Geo. L. J. 237, 247-53 (1996).  The taste theory was originally proposed by 
Becker.  See Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1957).  The statistical theory was originally set out in papers by Edmund Phelps and 
Kenneth Arrow.  See Kenneth Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in Discrimination in Labor 
Markets, 3-33, Orley Ashenfelter and Albert Rees, eds., Princeton University Press, 1973; 
Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, American Economic Review, 
659-61 (1972). 
42 This view of the historical function of discriminatory beliefs has been stressed recently by 
David Lyons in Unfinished Business: Racial Junctures in US History and Their Legacy, BU 
Working Paper, at 12, available at www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers. Eugene Genovese and C. 
Vann Woodward suggested (though not quite as clearly as Lyons) that racism may have served a 
similar function.  See Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made 23 (First 
Vintage Books Edition, 1976) (use of racism to degrade whites who associated with blacks); C. 
Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 85-87 (2d ed. 1966) (discussing movement to 
disenfranchise black voters). 
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Discrimination offers a solution, from the perspective of slaveholders, to 
this threat of expropriation.  It offers a status payoff to the majority of free, non-
slaveholders who might otherwise form a coalition in opposition to slavery.  If the 
status payoff is sufficiently great, they may find little incentive to impose 
constraints on the institution.  To return to the spongy bumper example, it was the 
refusal to disclose information on the technological alternative that prevents 
formation of a coalition that would impose the alternative on car manufacturers.  
In the slavery case, the putting out of a piece of information – the discriminatory 
belief – serves to prevent the formation of an opposing coalition.43 
 
To return to my broader point, the two cases considered, bargaining under 
transaction costs and discrimination, have been treated in the law and economics 
literature under a model of rational man that may be inadequate in its ability to 
explain real outcomes.  The weakly rational man of Calabresi’s Costs probably 
provides better insights into both cases.  To describe him as weakly rational, 
however, does not suggest that he is somehow less self-interested than is the 
rational man.  The opposite is the case.   The weakly rational man is a bit more of 
a brute than what we find generally assumed in the law and economics literature. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Law and economics has developed through tensions among certain broad 
strands of thought: normative versus positive economic analysis, positivist versus 
anti-positivist legal premises, and strong-form versus weak-form rationality 
assumptions.  Calabresi’s Costs laid the groundwork for economic analysis of law 
as a discipline within law schools, and established a template for modern 
economic analysis of law that is normative, positivist, and assumes weak-form 
rationality.  Indeed, any modern analysis of the operational efficiency of the legal 
system must borrow heavily from Calabresi.  At least in part because of the 
influence of Calabresi, the combination of normative economic analysis and legal 
positivism appears to have become the dominant approach in law and economics.  
However, any template has the negative consequence of displacing alternative 
approaches.  In the case of Calabresi’s Costs, the positive analysis reflected in the 
earlier work of Smith and Holmes, and the anti-positivist approach of Hume, 
Hayek, and Leoni were displaced.  Positive economic analysis of law quickly 
returned with Posner’s work, but the anti-positivist literature remains largely in 
the shadows.  The assumption of weak rationality has only recently begun to 
return to the forefront of law and economics. 
 
                                                 
43 Lyons, supra note 39. 
